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64 
INSUFFICIENT ACTIVITY AND TORT 
LIABILITY: A REJOINDER 
David Gilo* and Ehud Guttel** 
A response to Kenneth S. Abraham, Response, Insufficient Analysis of In-
sufficient Activity, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 24 (2009); Richard 
A. Epstein, Response, Activity Levels Under the Hand Formula, 108 Mich. 
L. Rev. First Impressions 37 (2009); Mark Grady, Response, Another The-
ory of Insufficient Activity Levels, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 30 
(2009). 
 
In our article, Negligence and Insufficient Activity, we proposed that tort 
scholarship has overlooked the risk that injurers will behave strategically in 
setting their activity levels. Whereas the standard literature has predicted 
that injurers who are subject to a negligence regime will often invest effi-
ciently in care but choose excessive activity levels, we showed that they 
may do exactly the opposite: injurers may deliberately restrict their activity 
to avoid investments in socially desirable precaution. After reviewing the 
conditions that may give rise to the risk of insufficient activity, we examined 
the ways in which the legal system can minimize the costs of such behavior. 
We hoped that our article would spark new interest in the interplay between 
tort liability and levels of care and activity. We are fortunate that three 
prominent tort scholars have already provided important insights on both 
our positive argument and our policy recommendations. 
These responses vary in their assessments of our contribution to legal 
scholarship. While some find that our article addresses an “interesting omis-
sion in tort law scholarship” and highlights a “missing paradigm” that is 
“central to negligence doctrine,” others consider it a “novel brick on a road 
that runs in the wrong direction.” Nevertheless, and although the responses 
focus on different parts of the article, they share several important objec-
tions to our analysis.  
The concerns raised by Professors Abraham,1 Epstein,2 and Grady3 can 
be divided into three categories. The first concern addresses our positive 
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L. Rev. First Impressions 24 (2009). 
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claim. The risk of insufficient activity levels, it is argued, is theoretically 
possible but unlikely to be significant in practice. The second concern ques-
tions the feasibility of our policy recommendations. According to this line of 
argument, to the extent insufficient activity poses a real problem, it cannot 
be resolved by the legal system. Finally, the third concern asserts that, even 
if the legal system were able to discourage insufficient activity levels, the 
ensuing costs would be prohibitive. The following rejoinder addresses and 
responds to each objection.  
I. IS THERE ACTUALLY A RISK OF INSUFFICIENT ACTIVITY LEVELS? 
Professors Grady and Epstein present two arguments against our predic-
tion of injurers’ strategic behavior. Grady suggests that our numerical 
results, illustrating injurers’ incentives to restrict their activity below the 
socially desirable level, largely hinge on the assumption of “lumpy” precau-
tion. In our examples, we discuss cases in which injurers can invest in a 
single precaution (e.g. a higher smokestack), the cost of which is unaffected 
by their activity levels (e.g. factory’s level of production). Grady argues that 
when a number of precautions are available (e.g. smokestacks of several 
heights), or when the cost of precaution is affected by activity levels, injur-
ers would no longer be able to derive an advantage from restricting their 
activity. While Grady focuses on our model, Epstein’s concern is doctrinal. 
Epstein primarily argues that the Hand formula—and its cost-benefit analy-
sis approach—accounts for only a narrow segment of tort liability in the real 
world. Many other harmful activities are not subject to the Hand formula; 
instead, statutes and regulations govern these activities with specific safety 
standards that do not rely on the injurer’s activity level. Injurers subject to 
such statutes and regulations, therefore, cannot escape a duty to invest in 
care by manipulating their activity level. Accordingly, Epstein concludes 
that our analysis regarding insufficient activity is largely unimportant.  
Our response to Grady’s claim is that the cost of precaution need not be 
“lumpy” for the insufficient activity result to materialize. As noted, Grady 
discusses two variations of non-lumpy precautions. The first variation con-
cerns cases in which increasing investment in precaution continuously 
reduces the level of harm. A railroad’s spark arrester, for example, can come 
in various gradations, each slightly more expensive than the other, where a 
more expensive arrester enables a larger reduction in the expected harm 
caused by fire. Under such circumstances, Grady suggests that insufficient 
activity cannot emerge. As we prove mathematically in the original article’s 
appendix, however, parties also have an incentive to strategically restrict 
their activity below the desirable level with non-lumpy precaution. The ex-
planation for this result is that injurers might prefer to engage in a low 
activity level since they bear the cost of precaution while the victims derive 
the benefits of such an investment.  Grady also discusses a second variation 
of non-lumpy precaution in which the cost of care depends on the level of 
activity. For example, a spark arrester could disturb the train’s motion, 
thereby causing the locomotive to burn more fuel. In that situation, the cost 
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of the spark arrester is directly proportional to the number of uses. Grady 
doubts that our result of insufficient activity would still hold in this case. We 
briefly addressed this important question in a variation of our polluting plant 
example, in which a polluting plant could eliminate the harm it caused by 
elevating its smokestack. As we demonstrate in footnote 47, even where the 
cost of elevating the plant’s smokestack increases with the activity level 
($120 in the low level and $125 in the high level), the plant would elect to 
engage in insufficient activity under a negligence regime. As long as the 
plant’s benefit from higher activity is lower than the cost of the precaution 
at the high level, the plant is better off restricting its activity.  
Professor Grady also notes the connection between our article and his 
previous work on durable and non-durable precautions. Elaborating on this 
distinction, Grady shows that when courts hold parties liable for their 
lapses, a negligence regime can lead to insufficient activity levels, particu-
larly when a contractual relationship exists between the parties. While 
Grady’s insight advances a different theory regarding the tort system’s in-
ability to induce efficient levels of activity, it reinforces our general claim 
that greater attention should be paid to the effect of liability regimes on ac-
tivity levels.     
As noted, Epstein’s critique rests on his assertion regarding the limited 
significance of the Hand formula in torts adjudication. Since courts usually 
do not engage in cost-benefit analysis when determining negligence, parties 
have no incentive to behave strategically in setting their activity levels. Our 
response to Epstein’s objection is twofold. First, irrespective of the interest-
ing empirical question regarding the percentage of cases in which the Hand 
formula itself is applied, cost-benefit analysis is often used to determine 
parties’ duty to take care under a wide range of circumstances. The cases we 
discuss in our article demonstrate this point. The court in Donovan—
assessing whether owners of a cannery are required by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act to insulate their equipment to reduce noise—
compared the costs of such a precaution to its expected benefit. Similarly, in 
Spanglo, where the standard of liability was recklessness, the court relieved 
the owner of a hockey rink from liability based on cost-benefit analysis. 
Thus, our analysis should not be viewed merely in the context of tort cases 
involving the Hand formula, but rather in the context of any harmful behav-
ior regulated on the basis of negligence-like cost benefit analysis.  
Second, as we explained in our article, the risk of insufficient activity 
may provide a new economic rationale precisely in those contexts of harm-
ful behaviors that are governed by statutes or regulations. Consider, for 
example, the circumstances in Donavan and imagine (contrary to the current 
legal regime) that regulations require every cannery to insulate its equip-
ment. Efficiency-oriented scholarship often regards such regulation as 
undesirable. Spending large amounts on precaution may be justified only if 
the expected harm is substantial. Accordingly, from an economic perspec-
tive, a duty to insulate should be limited to canneries with a large number of 
employees. The risk of strategic behavior, however, can justify such forms 
of regulation. A duty to invest in precaution, irrespective of the actual activ-
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ity level, removes the injurer’s incentive to set his activity below the so-
cially desirable level. Our discussion of the Entergy controversy shows how 
even a highly professional, efficiency-oriented organization such as the EPA 
can overlook the virtue of regulation that imposes standard environmental 
duties unrelated to the parties’ actual activity level. 
II. CAN THE LEGAL SYSTEM ELIMINATE THE 
RISK OF INSUFFICIENT ACTIVITY? 
In our article, we propose several ways that the legal system might ad-
dress the risk of insufficient activity. Our first suggestion involves extending 
the cost-benefit analysis that courts currently apply in determining liability. 
Under the conventional approach, courts examine the efficiency of untaken 
precautions against the background of the injurer’s actual activity level. The 
proposed approach would require courts to examine the cost-effectiveness 
of precautions, assuming the activity is carried out at the socially optimal 
level. Given this extended inquiry, injurers would no longer be able to avoid 
efficient investments in care by strategically limiting their engagement in 
the activity.  
Professors Abraham and Epstein argue that our proposal would be diffi-
cult to implement, given courts’ limited information. Under our suggested 
extended cost-benefit analysis, a plaintiff seeking compensation—the in-
jurer’s apparently reasonable behavior notwithstanding—would have to 
prove three elements: 
(1) A higher level of activity is socially desirable; 
(2) Given this activity level, investment in a precaution is cost-effective; and 
(3) Had the injurer invested in care, the victim’s harm would not have oc-
curred.  
Professor Epstein is somewhat skeptical regarding courts’ competence to 
determine the first element. Professor Abraham doubts whether courts 
would be able to resolve the third element when investment in care does not 
render the behavior entirely safe. He argues that if the injurer’s untaken pre-
caution is of the sort that does not completely eliminate the risk of harm, 
courts will face insurmountable informational hurdles in determining causa-
tion. 
We concede that our proposal may not always be easy to apply. Never-
theless, as we have shown, courts have overcome such informational 
hurdles in other contexts. Our discussion of the Esposito case demonstrates 
that in nuisance cases, courts often assess the costs and benefits of different 
activity levels to determine whether injurers engage in excessive activity. 
Under the regime we advocate, courts would perform a similar assessment 
to verify whether injurers engage in insufficient activity. As for courts’ abil-
ity to determine causation under our proposed regime, this inquiry should 
not be substantially more difficult than in many standard negligence cases. 
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The difficulty with regard to causation arises whenever some risk of harm 
would have remained even had the injurer not been negligent.  
Because courts will not always possess the required information, we 
propose in our original article two additional policy solutions. These pro-
posals show how legislatures, rather than courts, can reduce the possible 
social welfare loss resulting from insufficient activity. One proposal empha-
sizes the effectiveness of two types of regulations: those imposing industry-
specific (rather than firm-specific) safety standards and those setting maxi-
mum-harm restrictions on activities with negative externalities. The other 
proposal provides guidelines as to the choice between strict liability and 
negligence. By applying the appropriate liability regime, legislators can 
minimize parties’ private payoff from insufficient activity. Neither Abra-
ham’s nor Epstein’s critiques, which focus on courts’ informational 
constraints, address these proposals. Thus, even if Epstein and Abraham are 
correct, and courts are unable to apply the extended cost-benefit analysis, 
legislatures may still be able to solve the problem by following these pro-
posals to reduce the risk of injurers’ strategic conduct.   
III. THE COSTS OF REMOVING THE RISK OF 
INSUFFICIENT ACTIVITY: IS IT WORTH IT? 
Even if one is convinced that injurers behave strategically in setting 
their activity levels and that the legal system is capable of discouraging such 
behavior, we still must consider the costs of any proposed reform. If the 
costs of the necessary changes to the current doctrine outweigh the resulting 
benefits, a second-best solution is to simply ignore the risk of insufficient 
activity. In such a case, the legal system should retain the current regime 
despite the incentives it provides for strategic conduct.  
In this regard, Professor Abraham raises two arguments in favor of 
retaining the current form of liability and rejecting our proposal to expand 
the definition of negligence. First, he contends that if courts were allowed to 
impose liability for parties’ insufficient activity, such decisions would be 
perceived as an inappropriate infringement of parties’ autonomy. As 
Abraham argues, decisions regarding activity levels (e.g. how much to 
produce), as opposed to decisions regarding care levels (e.g. how carefully 
to produce), are usually considered to be within one’s private discretion. 
Consequently, even if liability for insufficient activity is justified from a 
social perspective, in practice “judges and juries will hesitate to impose it.” 
Professor Abraham’s second argument is that the imposition of liability for 
insufficient activity will excessively complicate the litigation process. To 
begin with, he argues that the determination of whether parties should have 
engaged in more activity is often a “polycentric” question that courts are ill 
equipped to resolve. However, even if courts were capable of making such 
decisions, Professor Abraham claims that allowing the parties to introduce 
arguments regarding activity levels will expose the courts to many such 
unsubstantiated claims. Rather than raising the issue only in cases 
presenting a genuine concern of the injurer’s possible strategic behavior, 
GILOGUTTEL FI FINAL REVIEW.DOC 3/3/2010 11:26 AM 
March 2010] Insufficient Activity & Tort Liability  69 
 
“parties will attempt to raise these questions at trial whenever the law 
permits them to do so.” According to Professor Abraham, when considering 
these two arguments together—a low likelihood of actually solving the 
problem and a high probability of increasing litigation costs—the proposed 
expansion of the definition of negligence is clearly undesirable.  
We stress that this type of critique is again restricted to the first solution 
that we discussed. Professor Abraham’s concerns address the costs and 
benefits of imposing liability for insufficient activity as part of the negli-
gence doctrine. They do not apply to our analysis regarding the design of 
regulations and the choice between negligence and strict liability. Thus, if 
courts and juries indeed cannot adequately solve the problem of injurers’ 
strategic conduct, the case for addressing the risk of insufficient activity on 
the legislative level is even more compelling.  
However, even if Professor Abraham’s arguments are examined only in 
the context of courts’ application of the negligence doctrine, it still remains 
to be seen to what extent his concerns are real. Because our suggestion to 
expand the basis of negligence deviates substantially from current doctrine, 
it is impossible to provide empirical evidence on the effects this change will 
have on judges’, juries’ and litigants’ behavior. Analysis of the development 
of negligence doctrine in the last century, however, reveals that similar ob-
jections were raised against other proposals to reform negligence liability 
that were later adopted. In retrospect, adopting these proposals did not lead 
to the detrimental results that had been predicted.  
An illuminating example can be found in the debate over the shift from 
contributory negligence to comparative negligence. Proponents of the com-
mon law tradition opposed this change on the grounds that it would likely 
complicate the litigation process without providing any real advantage. With 
respect to potential benefits, opponents of comparative negligence argued 
that judges and juries would usually refuse to grant compensation to victims 
without “clean hands” (victims who themselves contributed to the materiali-
zation of the harm). Thus, as a practical matter, in most cases the general 
rule would continue to be that of the all-or-nothing contributory negligence 
regime rather than the more flexible comparative negligence regime. With 
respect to potential costs, opponents of comparative negligence argued that 
the new regime would only motivate parties to litigate over the precise allo-
cation of fault, especially when the stakes are high, thereby raising the 
overall costs of litigation. Likewise, opponents raised doubts as to courts’ 
competence to reach sensible decisions regarding the allocation of fault. 
Courts may have had little trouble determining whether a party failed to 
comply with the relevant legal norm. However, striking the balance between 
two parties who failed to uphold the legal standard would have involved 
“polycentric” questions that courts were ill equipped to resolve. To oppo-
nents, it was one thing to determine, for example, whether manufacturers’ 
products were defective. It was an entirely different issue to decide if, and to 
what extent, manufacturers’ liability for defective products should be re-
stricted if consumers were also careless in using them. Therefore, resolving 
the second problem necessitated addressing thorny questions of policy. 
GILOGUTTEL FI FINAL REVIEW.DOC 3/3/2010 11:26 AM 
70 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 108 
 
In hindsight, these objections proved to be unjustified. The trend in the 
United States and abroad has been towards replacing contributory negli-
gence with various forms of comparative negligence. Despite the above-
mentioned concerns, courts have successfully integrated the new doctrine 
into the tort system. While there are various proposals to lower the level of 
compensation for different types of harm and to simplify the litigation proc-
ess in tort-related suits, comparative negligence seems to only gain in 
popularity. To be sure, the success of comparative negligence does not nec-
essarily mean that our proposal will work equally well. But it does suggest 
that questions regarding the competence of the courts might be less founded 
than they initially appear.   
 
*           *          * 
 
Under the current legal regime, parties are usually liable for the harm 
they inflict only to the extent that their behavior is unreasonable. In deter-
mining what constitutes unreasonable conduct, courts and policymakers 
seeking to maximize social welfare often apply cost-benefit analysis. Our 
theory of insufficient activity indentifies a potentially significant gap in the 
way in which this analysis is conventionally conducted. The insightful re-
sponses to our article suggest that further analysis may be required to assess 
both the size of the problem and the ways to resolve it. We intend to further 
explore these questions and hope to continue to benefit from the important 
and valuable critiques of our colleagues.  
